Terrorism instills fear in the minds of people and takes away the freedom of individuals to act as they will. Terrorism has turned out to be an international menace in the global community; every nation is getting affected, directly or indirectly. Here, we study the terrorist attack incidents which occurred in the last half century across the globe from the open source, Global terrorism database, and develop a view on their spatio-temporal dynamics. We construct a complex network of global terrorism and study its growth dynamics, along with the statistical properties of the network, which are quite intriguing. Normally, each nation pursues its own vision of international security based upon its mandate and particular notions of politics and its policies to counter the threat of terrorism that could naturally include the use of tactical measures and strategic negotiations, or even physical power. We study the resilience of the network against targeted attacks and random failures, which could guide the counter-terrorist outfits in designing strategies to fight terrorism. We then use a disparity filter method to isolate the backbone of the giant component, and identify the terror hubs and vulnerable motifs of global terrorism. We also examine the evolution of the hubs and motifs in a few exemplary cases like Afghanistan, Colombia, Israel, Peru and United Kingdom. The dynamics of the terror hubs and the vulnerable motifs that we discover in the network backbone can provide deep insight on their formations and spreading, and thereby help in contending terrorism or making public policies that can check their spread.
Introduction
Humans are social animals and since the early days of evolution, they have preferred to form and stay together in groups. These groups have evolved from simple settlements to huge nations; defined by multiple causes like language, common heritage, geographical boundaries, and even ideology. The human cooperation has been a motivating force behind the rapid progress of man 1 . Often evolutionary efforts induced the increase in human cooperation. Various factors, like delayed self-sustenance of young ones, or fear of elimination by neighboring communes competing for similar resources which obstructed the humans to sustain their progeny became reasons for cooperation. This cooperation extended from blood relatives to totally unrelated individuals. Surprisingly, evolution has also been responsible for drawing distinctions among themselves in their bids for survival of the fittest. This segregation 2, 3 can be seen in various forms like race, caste, class, religion, political ideology, etc. Thus, the human social behavior has been extremely convoluted with multiple parameters playing crucial roles. It is extremely difficult to assess the complexity of human social behavior, which has a wide range -co-operations, bonding, conflicts, aggression, coups, wars, etc. Similar to conflicts, aggression and wars, which have plagued mankind from antiquity, acts of terrorism -where a small group of individuals which are similarly motivated in fighting another social institution or organization or exercising indiscriminate violence in achieving financial, political, religious or ideological aim are hardly new. Though there is no single definition, terrorism may be broadly defined as a conscious and deliberate attempt to incite fear among masses through violence or the threat of violence to pursue a political or ideological gain 4, 5 . The aim of terrorism is not limited to eliminating the target group or destruction of opponent's resources, rather it is specifically carried out to send out a psychological message to the adversary. It is meant to propagate fear among the wider general public which may encompass rival religious or ethnic group, a state government, or an entire country. Terrorists seek to gain leverage they lack on a political scale by changing the scales of power. Even though terrorism has been prevalent ever since modern political landscape has existed, past few decades have seen an exponential increase in terrorist incidents. The scope and nature of terrorist attacks have also evolved rapidly, a fact that became evident to the world on September 11, 2001 , when a series of four coordinated attacks were conducted by the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda in the United States. Academic and social media reports show an increase in the number of terrorist acts being carried out by an increasing number of terrorist organizations, with extending stretch of the target locations at a global scale. These realities have made it incessantly difficult for counter-terrorist organizations or governments in terminating these terrorist acts.
Apart from solutions by social scientists, physicists have recently tried to provide mathematical models, statistical and network analyses and potential solutions to the menaces of terrorism [6] [7] [8] and conflicts 9 . Like business conglomerates, terrorist organizations have also formed transnational ties. They are inter-connected (in a state) and have links with other terrorist organizations outside of the geographical boundaries of the target state.
In this paper, we develop and present a network based study 10, 11 of identification of terrorists and their targets. The international terrorist network is examined and vulnerable motifs of global terrorism network are identified. We analyze the terrorist events from the Global Terrorism database (GTD) 12, 13 , which collected reports from the printed and digital media, over the span of 1970-2016. We construct a complex network of global terrorism and investigate the network characteristics of this anti-social network. We study the resilience of the network against targeted attacks and random failures 11, 14 , which could guide the counter-terrorist outfits in designing strategies to fight terrorism. We also use the disparity filter method 15 to isolate the backbone of this network, and identify the terror hubs and vulnerable motifs of global terrorism. We then examine the evolution of the hubs and motifs in a few special cases like Afghanistan, Colombia, Israel, Peru and United Kingdom. The backbone evolution and change of relative importance of the terror hubs and the vulnerable motifs are analyzed.
Results

Network construction, structure and backbone
We analyze the terrorist attacks over the entire 46 year period , excluding 1993 (non-availability of data for the given period). In our study, the temporal granularity of the data is one day. Fig. 1 (Top) shows the spatio-temporal distribution of the events across the globe; the dots representing the locations are colored according to different decades during which the events occurred. Evidently, past few decades have seen an exponential increase in terrorist incidents (see Supplementary  Information Fig. S7 for the plots attack details and Fig. S8 for the impact of attacks across the globe). Over a period of time τ, we construct the network of 'connected' actors in the following way: Whenever a terrorist source, actor a 1 , attacks a target, actor a 2 , it is recorded as an event E 1 at time t ∈ [t 0 : t 0 + τ], a directed link 'connects' the source to the target by an arrow of unit weight, where t 0 is the initial time in the entire span τ. If another event E 2 within the same time window involves source a 3 and target a 2 , then a 3 is connected to a 2 with a directed link of unit weight. Thus, sources a 1 and a 3 are both connected to the common target a 2 . Aggregating all such events over the time window τ, connected components are formed, as shown in Fig.  1 (Bottom Left). The terrorist network for the entire period consists of 5568 nodes, 64855 edge mentions and 10379 unique edges, with the giant component in grey consisting of 5148 nodes. Thus, the giant component encompasses more than 92% of the network nodes. The decade-wise evolution of the network along with its giant component is displayed in Fig. S9 of the Supplementary Information.
We extracted (i) the number of mentions m of each individual actor (source or target) and (ii) the number of co-mentions w of an unique pair of actors (source-target), as well as the number of unique actors k, one actor is involved with. In terms of the network theory, m measures node strength, w the link weight and k the degree of a node (out-degree for sources and in-degree for targets). While m and k measure the importance, activity or visibility of a single actor, w measures the frequency of involvement of an actor pair (source-target) in the terrorist events. Since this is a directed network, the nodes have distinct out-degree and in-degree distributions.
To find the backbone structure of the weighted network, we have used an algorithm proposed by Serrano et al. 15 . The disparity filter algorithm extracts the network backbone by considering the relevant edges at all the scales present in the system and by exploiting the local heterogeneity and local correlations among the weights. The disparity filter has a cut-off parameter α c , the choice of which is arbitrary. It effectively controls the number of nodes and the edges that appear in the backbone. The effect of α c on the backbone is displayed in Figure S10 and summarized in Table S2 in Supplementary Information. We have chosen α c = 0.01 such that it enables us to follow the country-wise evolution of the terror hubs and vulnerable motifs that appear in the backbone structures. Using the value of the cut-off parameter α c = 0.01, we extracted the backbones of the networks for the different periods of evolution. Fig. 1 (Bottom Right) shows the backbone for the network with the aggregated data 1970 to 2016, consisting of 470 nodes (8% of the total network), 427 edges (4% of the total network) and 40467 edge mentions (62% of the total network). The list of names of all the 470 nodes (190 sources and 280 targets) are given in Tables S3-S4 in the Supplementary Information. Fig. 2 shows the growing backbones of the networks for the different decades of evolution. As time evolves the backbone structure grows (number of nodes and edges increase) and becomes more intricate. The number of nodes, unique edges, edge mentions, number of clusters, and the average number of neighbors a node possesses in the growing backbone structures as shown in Fig. 2 , are summarized in Table 1 . Interestingly, the number of source-target pairs in the backbone structures-indicated by the number of edges, is around 4% for most years. However, their frequencies of engagement-indicated by the number of edge mentions, grows steadily from 38% (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) to 62% (1970-2016) . The average number of neighbors a node possesses, also increases from 1.537 (1970-1980 ) to 1.817 (1970-2016) .
The complementary cumulative probability density function (CCDF) for degree Q(k) (out-and in-degrees), mentions Q(m) for sources and targets, and the co-mentions Q(w) show broad distributions, fitting either power-law, log-normal or stretched exponential distributions (see Fig. 3 ). The CCDF's Q(s) of the cluster size s for the growing networks are shown in Fig. 3 ; evidently, the outliers correspond to the sizes of the growing giant cluster (as percentage of the total number of nodes in the Table S5 in Supplementary Information for the list of top-50 actor pairs-source-target). The broad degree distributions indicate that the number of actors engaging with very large number of actors are also quite significant; the form of the distribution shows little change. Notably, the average clustering coefficient of the nodes in the backbone is zero (indicating the absence of loops), contrary to most social networks of friendships, collaborations, etc., where typically the average clustering coefficient is high 10, 11 .
Tolerance of network to attack and failure
We study how the network breaks down under attack, in order to stop terrorism activities to happen 14 . The largest connected component of the network (i.e., the giant component) is subjected to targeted attack by removal of the most connected nodes (in terms of the source out-degree, which corresponds to a terrorist organization, etc.). As the network is directed, so we started by removing the source node with the highest out-degree, followed by the next highest out-degree and so on. This results in rapid fragmentation or destruction of the network by removing all the source nodes/negative nodes. We compute the fraction of nodes GC present in the largest cluster, which is observed to decrease very quickly, and the average number of nodes in the isolated clusters other than the giant component ac , with increasing fraction of removed nodes. The network and the giant component are destroyed faster by targeted nodes removal (attack), compared to the random node removal (failure), as shown in Fig. 4 .
Evolution of the hubs and motifs in the backbone structure
Using the disparity filter method, we isolate the backbone of this network and identify the terror hubs and vulnerable motifs of global terrorism. As obvious, all the terror hubs and vulnerable motifs that are very frequently engaged appear in the backbone. We show in Fig. 5 , the evolution of the hubs and motifs in a few exemplary cases like Afghanistan (AFG), Colombia (COL), Israel (ISR), Peru (PER) and United Kingdom (GBR). The very fact that the backbone structure evolves indicates that often some terrorist organizations gain more prominence than others. Examining these hubs and motifs, we observe that the star-structure occurs quite frequently in the backbone: one source attacking many targets, or one target being attacked by many sources. The backbone structure of ISR grows from a simple structure of three nodes (1 source and 2 targets; average degree 1.33) in 1970-1980, to an intricate structure of twenty nodes (14 sources and 6 targets; average degree 1.90) in 1970-2016. The backbone structure of GBR remains fairly the same; the average degree grows from 1.85 (1970-1980 ) to 1.91 (1970-2016) ; the Irish Republican Army is the main terrorist hub, while the private citizens and property is the most vulnerable target for the entire duration. In COL, the backbone structure grows from a simple 3 node (1 source and 2 targets) in 1970-1980 to a clustered 11 nodes (5 sources and 6 targets) in ; the average degree jumps from 1.33 to 2.91. Then it grows steadily to a closely knit structure of 15 nodes (6 sources and 9 targets) at the end of 2016. Interestingly, AFG does not appear in the backbone till the 2000-2010, and government (Diplomatic) GOVD USA is a common target which links two countries AFG and PER. This is typically the case in many other empirical networks, where there exists a node connecting two modules or communities 16 . In AFG and PER, we again see the appearance of star structures, as in GBR. We have also observed in Fig. 2 that El Salvador (SLV) had appeared in 1970-1980 and 1970-1990 backbones, but does not appear since then; this conforms to the fact that Chapultepec peace accords were signed in 1992. These observations on the dynamics of the terror hubs and the vulnerable motifs in the network backbone that we highlighted above, can provide deep insight on their formations and spreading, and thereby help in contending terrorism or making public policies that can reduce their spread. Our results for the range of provided parameters describe the evolution of terrorism in the above countries that emerge from the network analysis. The results are in no way a comment on the previous policies of the Governments of the countries considered.
Discussions
We have examined the spatio-temporal dynamics of the terrorist events across the globe, using the Global Terrorism database (GTD) 12, 13 over the span of 46 years from 1970 to 2016. We developed the view of a complex network of global terrorism and studied its growth dynamics along with the statistical regularities of the network properties. The statistical properties of the network are quite interesting and robust. The network always has a giant component, which is about 83% to 92% of the total number of nodes in the network. The complementary cumulative probability density functions for the degrees (k), mentions (m), and source-target mentions (w) are broad (power laws, log-normals or stretched exponentials). We studied the resilience of the network against targeted attacks and random failures. The giant component disappears after about 33% of the hubs (in descending order of magnitude) are removed; in the case of random removal of sources, the giant component disappears much slower-only after 87% of the sources are removed. We isolated the backbone of the terrorist network using the disparity filter method, and identified the terror hubs and vulnerable motifs of global terrorism. The backbones for the various decades contain between 8% to 16% of the total number of the nodes; the number of unique edges remain fairly constant around 4% of the total number of edges in the network. Most importantly, the edge mentions grow from 38% to 62% of the total network, signifying very high frequency of engagement between a small number of source-target pairs. The terror hubs and vulnerable motifs are
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seen to have star structures more frequently than by chance. The average degree of a node in the backbone increases steadily as time evolves. The average clustering coefficient is always observed to be zero (indicating the absence of triangles) in the growing network, as well as the evolving backbone. We analyzed the evolutionary structures of the hubs and motifs in a few special cases like Afghanistan, Colombia, Israel, Peru and United Kingdom. We also observed that US citizens, businessmen, and other organizations are often the common target nodes linking different closed knit communities of terrorist organizations from other countries. The observation that El Salvador appeared only in the backbones of 1970 − 1980 and 1970 − 1990 and not thereafter, conforming to the fact that Chapultepec peace accords were signed in 1992, is a significant outcome of the network backbone analysis.
The political and socioeconomic conditions along with the local circumstances of a region, play key roles in framing anti-terrorism policies and elimination of terrorist ties. The inter-disciplinary approaches of network analysis that we have used in this paper, may provide supplementary knowledge and insight on the formation and spreading of terrorism, and thereby help the international security agencies in contending terrorism, as well as produce acumen for the policy makers and experts of international relations.
Materials and Methods
Data description and filtration
The source for this analysis is open-access data 12, 13 generously provided by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism(START), University of Maryland. The data provides a detailed account of terrorist events from 1970 to 2016, except for year 1993 for which no data existed. The dataset has 170350 instances divided into 135 attributes. The dataset required considerable cleaning before any study could be done. The doubtful events, suggested by dataset itself, were removed. Further, attacks carried out by 'Unknown' terrorist organization on 'Unknown' targets were also filtered out. The events which had no spatial information in the dataset were removed, too. To maintain the network modularity at country level any attack which targeted international community instead of a particular nationality was also removed from the dataset.The feature selection consisted of removing explanatory attributes of the dataset. The cleaning left us with 64980 instances of 11 attributes (see Fig. S6 in Supplementary Information).
Disparity filter to identify backbone
To find the backbone structure of a weighted network, we have used the algorithm proposed by Serrano et al. 15 . The disparity filter algorithm extracts the network backbone by considering the relevant edges at all the scales present in the system and exploiting the local heterogeneity and local correlations among the weights. The disparity filter has a cut-off parameter α c , which determines the number of edges that are reduced in the original network. The filter however, preserves the cutoff of the degree distribution, the form of the weight distribution, and the clustering coefficient.
Supplementary information Data
The data source utilized for this quantitative analysis of terrorism is obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, United States. The database was built on unclassified source material publicly available in media, digital news archives, books, journals, and some legal documents. GTD contains 170350 terrorist events reported for a period of 46 years from 1970 to 2016. The events of 1993 are not present in the database as they were lost prior to START's compilation. The dataset includes 135 variables such as GTD Id, date of incident, incident location, incident information, attack information, target/victim information,perpetrator information, perpetrator statistics, claims of responsibility, weapon information, casualty information, consequences, kidnapping/hostage taking information, additional information, and source information. A snapshot of few variables is shown in Figure 6 . 
Fatalities vs. injured
The impact of the terrorist attacks, as given by the number of persons killed or wounded, are shown in Figure S8 . Interestingly, they have broad distributions. 
Evolution of Network and Giant Component
Decade-wise evolution of the network and its giant component is shown in Figure S9 . 
Effect of the disparity filter cut-off α c on the backbone
The comparison of backbone characteristics (as percentage figures of the total weights %W T of the network, total nodes %N T in the network and total unique edges %E T in the network) with the change in disparity filter cut-off α c , for the different evolving backbones for the period 1970-2016, is summarized in Table S2 . Table 2 . Comparison of backbone characteristics (as percentage figures of the total weights %W T of the network, total nodes %N T in the network and total unique edges %E T in the network) with the change in disparity filter cut-off α c , for the different evolving backbones.
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The backbone structures are displayed in the Figure S10 . (From Top to Bottom) Different decades 1970-1980, 1970-1990, 1970-2000, 1970-2010 and 1970-2016 , respectively.
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Lists of names of sources, targets and actor pairs The names of 190 sources and their abbreviations that appear in the backbone of the global terrorist network with 470 nodes are given in Table S3 . Table 4 . Names and abbreviations of Targets that appear in the backbone structure .
